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INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM ON FREDERIC MEGRET, "ARE THERE

'INHERENTLY SOVEREIGN FUNCTIONS' IN INTERNATIONAL LAW?"
Melissa J. Durkee*
Imagine a future in which the U.S. government has closed the postal service, shuttered its administrative
apparatus, and stopped funding education. Confirmation battles have dismantled the federal judiciary, with
most adjudication now performed by private arbitrators. After years of erosion of public standards, corporate
environmental and labor practices are now left to voluntary self-regulation and market pressures. Private military
and security companies command and regulate a vast military infrastructure, executing contracts to meet U.S. intelligence and defense requirements. Prisons have been fully privatized. After losing faith in elections, the U.S. populace no longer insists on them. The country is administered by a small cadre of officials whose job mainly involves
negotiating and monitoring contracts with the many private companies that run the shop.
The vision may be dystopian. Is it also illegal under international law?
This is the essential question Frederic Megret takes up in "Are There 'Inherently Sovereign Functions' in
International Law?," an article recently published in the American Journal of InternationalLaw, and the subject of
this symposium.1 Megret is concerned that the neoliberal trend toward creeping privatization seems to "hollow
out the state," 2 threatening human rights protections and perhaps international law itself. He asks whether international law requires that a core set of functions be performed by a public authority-the state-and whether it
sets limits on what may be outsourced to private actors. In doing so, he embraces the idea that international law is
engaged with sovereign states in the project of co-constitution-that international law has constructed "the very
concept of sovereignty 'from without"'-and may have something to say about what a sovereign state is, or must
be.
As the contributions to this symposium illustrate, such a project could have a variety of starting points. Mgret's
choice is to look at the norms enshrined in positive law and to reason inductively, building an account and
taxonomy of inherently sovereign functions based on the international legal obligations states hold to each
other and to their populations. The account acknowledges an array of important challenges: that, on its face,
international law has been rather ambiguous or agnostic about the internal constitution of the state, especially
the line between public and private. That, moreover, this line has historically been fluid: "there is almost no function that . .. has not historically beenH exercised by actors other than states." 4 Indeed, Mgret's first line of inquiry,
which focuses on the horizontal obligations of the interstate system, does not offer a very thick account of what
might be inherently sovereign. Perhaps states are required to maintain the "ability to delegate" governmental tasks,
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since the Montevideo criteria require the capacity to govern. Perhaps there is something in the monopoly on the
use of force, requiring, at least, that states hold on to the decision to wage war?5 The analysis is striking for how
little the interstate system seems to require of states.
Where Megret's analysis gains real purchase is in the second line of inquiry, where he asks what might be derived
from states' vertical obligations to their populations, specifically as enshrined in international human rights law.
Here, despite the law's professed neutrality to governmental form, Megret elicits the requirement that the state
serve as the ultimate guarantor of human rights, providing implementation, supervisory, and remedial functions
that enable it to serve that role. Although he acknowledges that other actors, specifically corporations, can be
bound to respect human rights, it is states that must ensure their implementation. To do that, a state must
have some minimum core and competence to act. Thus, in Megret's account, it is human rights law that demands
something recognizable as "statehood," as that law requires "a broad range of supervisory functions that implicate
the very democratic apparatus of the state." 6
This symposium includes five contributions by leading authorities in law, political science, and political theory.
The responses challenge, affirm, supplement, and reframe the project of defining what may lie in the mandatory
core of sovereign statehood, offering intriguing reflections on, for example, what it means for a state to "govern,"
what is the essence of a "public" realm, whether international law demands publicness of other institutions than
the state, and what is at the normative core of these inquiries.
Eyal Benvenisti of Cambridge University and the Hebrew University ofJerusalem suggests that Megret's argument could be read to articulate a "human right to the state." 7 Benvenisti would situate this right within a tradition
that conceives of state sovereignty as afforded for the purpose of facilitating responsibility to individuals.
The territorial rootedness of sovereignty encourages this. States cannot outsource the task of governing to territorially unmoored "private corporations that can effortlessly relocate once they are done plundering the natural
resources of areas they exploit, having immiserated the local population." Benvenisti would elaborate this human
right to the state by invoking the normative grounds of human agency and dignity, which suggest a state's obligation to protect individual and collective self-determination and to maintain the "publicness" of governance.
Finally, the "publicness" of international organizations also requires shoring up in the face of insulating immunities
and corrosive pressures by private interests.
Samantha Besson of the College de France and the University of Fribourg also affirms the importance of publicness at the international level. She would shift the analysis beyond a concern with states and their functions
altogether, in favor of a focus on "the institutional dimension of international public law." 8 She explains that
"[c]aring for the publicness of international law" requires more than understanding the legality of privatization
under that law. Instead, it requires a more "foundational" understanding of how the international public represents
itself through law and legal institutions, which include both states and international organizations, among others.
In fact, focusing onfunctions entrenches the kind of problem Megret's analysis is meant to address: it encourages
thinking about functions as interchangeable, "outsourceable," and of equal value. It encourages thinking of private
functions as "publicizable," and the international public as dispensable. Addressing the privatization concern
motivating the article requires dropping both functionalism and the identification of the public with the state
in favor of an approach that seeks to understand the full "continuum" of institutions by which the international
public orders itself and is ordered.
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Jean Cohen of Columbia University also dispenses with functionalism, outlining the "normative basis of the
ideas of sovereignty and publicness" that undergird Megret's analysis. 9 Cohen observes that democracy itself
cannot be derived through Megret's method, from human rights protections, but she argues that "democracy
and human rights do mutually co-constitute each other in the long run." This is because democratic deliberation
"makes those who are subject to the law its authors" and defines the nature and scope of rights protections.
Cohen's normatively grounded approach affirms the "intrinsic value of publicness of public power in connection
with democratically legitimate sovereignty." In doing so it emphasizes accountability and representativeness and,
fundamentally, the need for democratic societies to maintain the capacity to self-govern-including the capacity to
regulate private corporate self-regulators-in order to foster the common good.
Nigel White of the University of Nottingham considers corporate self-regulation of fundamental concern in the
context of regulation of the use of force. 10 White argues that the monopoly on use of force requires states to do
more than hold on to the decision to wage war; they must also "regulate its exercise through public laws adopted
within national and international constitutional frameworks." White's premise is that sovereignty requires
"supreme authority" domestically and a capacity to act internationally. Outsourcing too much authority to private
military and security companies (PMSCs) undermines both of these aspects. To illustrate the stakes, White reviews
the United Kingdom's decision to allow PMSCs to self-regulate, which "effectively freed PMSCs from the
constraints of public law and public international law," with detrimental consequences for the United
Kingdom's capacity to meet its international legal obligations. In the end, White supports Megret's conclusion
that even if certain functions related to use of force can legitimately be outsourced, "the specific supervisory
and remedial features of such a regime . .. must [themselves] be public.""
Sooner or later, everything old is new again. Daniel Lee of the University of California, Berkeley, vividly illustrates that Megret's concerns about the transfer of public functions to unaccountable, profit-seeking entities were
foreshadowed in the pre-Westphalian era.1 2 He focuses on the sixteenth century theorist Jean Bodin, who built a
theory of sovereign exclusivity by identifying "which marques [of sovereignty] are not shared in common," with
non-sovereigns like princes or feudal lords, finding eight such "marques," or rights, which have at their core
the fundamental right of legislative authority. In Bodin's analysis, sovereign rights "cannot be divided or alienated
away" without the loss of sovereignty itself, though the sovereign can delegate. As Lee points out, Bodin's motivation for developing this analysis was not so remote from the concerns of our time: "[t]he cash-strapped, debtburdened Valois monarchy devised sketchy tactics to raise revenue, one of which was the lucrative practice of
the ...
sale of public offices to private individuals." Sovereignty is not, Bodin wanted to affirm, "a vendible
asset." The analysis still resonates in light of Megret's current concerns.
Something more is required of our governing institutions than the dystopian contractual minimum. This affirmation emerges as a common ground for the contributions to this symposium, as well as the article that precipitated it. All suggest a more robust vision, whether characterized as the authority to facilitate and implement rights,
individual and collective self-determination, representation of a global public, democratic deliberation and
accountability, regulatory authority, or legislative activity. Taken as a whole, the symposium invites further reflection on how to elicit the core requirements of governance, how to characterize them, and why they matter.
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